"Despite wishful thinking on Palazzolo's part, he
paid a modest sum to invest in a proposed subdivision that
he must have known from the outset was problematic at best.
Constitutional law does not require the state to guarantee
a bad investment."
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, C.A. No. WM 88-0297 (R.I.
Super Ct. July 5, 2005)
Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized that
the needs of society have varied between different parts
of the Nation, just as they have evolved over time in response
to changed circumstances. Our earliest cases in particular
embodied a strong theme of federalism, emphasizing the "great
respect" that we owe to state legislatures and state
courts in discerning local public needs.
Kelo v. City of New London (U.S. 2005)
"On occasion, a would be doctrinal rule or test finds
its way into our case law through simple repetition of a
phrase however fortuitously coined. * * * This case requires
us to decide whether the 'substantially advances' formula
announced in Agins is an appropriate test for determining
whether a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment taking. We
conclude that it is not."
Lingle v. Chevron (U.S. 2005)
"In areas of traditional state regulation, we assume
that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless
Congress has made such an intention 'clear and manifest.'"
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, slip op. at 16 (U.S.
April 27, 2005)
"So we have to eat crow no matter what we do, right?"
Justice Antonin Scalia during the oral argument in Lingle
v. Chevron, evidently recognizing the need for the Court
to confess error in articulating the "substantially
advance" test in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980).
"Isn't that changing the test for 'public use' to
'efficient public use'? You want us to sit here and evaluate
the prospects of each condemnation, one by one?"
Justice Antonin Scalia at the oral argument in Kelo
v. New London, questioning counsel for the landowners
about their proposed heightened scrutiny for eminent domain
use to promote economic development.
"[T]he idea that courts had the power to supervise
legislative expropriations would have been unfamiliar to
the members of the Congress who drafted the so-called Takings
Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the
Original Understanding of the So-called Takings Clause,
53 Hastings L. J. 1245 (2002) (explaining why courts should
respect legislative decisions to use eminent domain).